How John Mearsheimer Would Have Explained Imperial China

If John Mearsheimer had a time machine and a knack for Mandarin, he’d probably walk into the Qing court and tell the emperor: “You’re playing the great power game all wrong.” His offensive realism – where states (or in this case, dynasties) seek dominance in an anarchic world – would fit snugly into China’s long history of power struggles, border conflicts, and strategic maneuvering.

Imperial China, particularly under the Ming and Qing, often teetered between isolationism and expansion. A Mearsheimerian critique? That’s pure strategic folly. He’d argue that China’s failure to maintain forward expansion and its tendency to wall itself off (both metaphorically and literally) allowed external powers – be it the Mongols, the British, or even the Japanese – to dictate terms. The Canton System? A laughable attempt at control. The Opium Wars? A brutal lesson in what happens when a great power ignores balance-of-power dynamics.

But here’s the twist: Imperial China, for much of its history, was the hegemon of East Asia, commanding tributary states and influencing regional politics. Yet, it never fully embraced the aggressive state-building Mearsheimer champions. Instead, it oscillated between cultural superiority and strategic complacency – until, of course, the 19th century came knocking with gunboats and treaties written in languages the emperor didn’t particularly care to understand.

So, what’s the Mearsheimer lesson here? Simple: If you don’t actively assert dominance, someone else will. And if you think walls can keep the chaos out, just ask the last Qing emperor how that worked out. Spoiler: It didn’t.